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Law and Technology
Digitocracy
Considering law and governance in the digital age.
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unleashed profound forces
changing and reshaping
rule making in the democracies of the information
society. Today, we are witnessing a
transformative period for law and
governance in the digital age. Elected
representative government and democratically chosen rules vie for authority with new players who have emerged
from the network environment. At the
same time, network technologies have
unraveled basic foundational prerequisites for the rule of law in democracy
like privacy, freedom of association,
and government oversight. The digital
age, thus, calls for the emergence of a
Digitocracy—a new set of more complex
governance mechanisms assuring public accountability for online power held
by state and nonstate actors through
the creation of new checks and balances among a more diverse group of
players than democracy’s traditional
grouping of a representative legislature, executive branch, and judiciary.
Where Google and Facebook know
more than most spy agencies about the
lives of millions of citizens as well as the
inner workings of companies and governments, information powerhouses
and platforms can establish their own
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rules for citizens’ interactions online.
Where public-sector surveillance and
private-sector tracking are so pervasive,
citizens lose the ability to control the
disclosure of their thoughts, friends,
activities, and no longer have privacy.
Where lone coders wreak massive havoc for private gain or for opposition to
governmental policies, they can use
their information resources to reject
majority rule. Where technology can
protect the anonymity of wrongdoers,
rule-breakers can escape accountability. In short, the modern information
society destroys one of the most fundamental truths of any democracy that
“the power to make the laws rests with
those chosen by the people.”a
a King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015).

We are witnessing
a transformative
period for law
and governance
in the digital age.
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The Internet’s Promise
Without a doubt, the Internet revolutionized the dissemination of information and the ability of individuals to
engage with each other. The euphoria
surrounding the early days of the Internet’s expansion into the public sphere
predicted that technology would expand democracy and empower citizens
around the world. The conventional
wisdom thought citizen participation
would multiply online with e-government, and the public would have better
oversight of the state thanks to new capabilities for monitoring administrative and executive actions. The power
of the Internet to disseminate information from one to millions and the power of the Internet to foster conversations seemed an unstoppable force for
democratic discourse. Popular movements like the Arab Spring, the Occupy
Movement, and the Bernie Sanders
U.S. presidential campaign illustrated
that information technologies could
indeed significantly enhance and enable political organizing on a new,
unprecedented scale. Many expected
that mechanisms like open electronic
proceedings for rule making and open
data for government transparency
would herald better representative government and decision making.
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The Internet’s technical infrastructure turns out to challenge the promise
of the political empowerment of citizens. Just as network technologies offered organizational tools for political
empowerment, the technologies themselves provided the means to reverse the
hope that the Internet would be a oneway pro-democracy force. Network infrastructure proved that it could be used
to frustrate empowerment dreams.
Egypt, for example, pulled the plug on
the Internet for several days during the
Arab Spring uprisings to block political
organizing; Brazil shut down WhatsApp
for 48 hours; local police in the U.S. used
stealth Stingray technology to engage in
large-scale geo-surveillance of citizens.
And, at the same time, Twitter bots
flooded social media in order to shut
down political dialog or to falsify support for candidates, while hate and bullying flourish online. In short, the Internet has embedded the means to block
political empowerment and discourse.
Undermining Democracy
In the intervening years since the early
euphoria over the Internet’s political
potential, the embedding of the In-

ternet in our daily lives has effectively
demonstrated new vulnerabilities. The
Internet’s infrastructure has already
displaced three key areas essential to
the rule of law in democracy: sovereignty, government accountability,
and respect for law. Internet technologies restructure a state’s ability to prescribe and assure the enforcement of
law. Governments forfeit sovereignty
to networks when services like cloud
computing transcend borders and
enable organizations to choose rules
in the blink of an eye. Network architecture enables technology developers and service providers to embed
rules for online activities through
infrastructure choices. For example,
cloud service providers like Dropbox
make determinations every day on
the security of users’ data. These encryption decisions determine the very
capability of states to examine user
data in lawful investigations.
Network infrastructure undermines
the oversight and accountability of
government. While open government
technologies enable greater transparency of public institutions, electronic
tools also empower governments to

circumvent traditional political checks
and balances and the public’s oversight of government suffers irreparably. For example, in Oakland, CA, the
police engaged in a mass-scale surveillance program to geo-locate thousands
of mobile phones using stingray devices without any judicial approval and, in
New York City, the police program to
record drivers through traffic cams and
smart city sensors also escapes judicial
oversight. At the same time, technologically enabled leaks and wide dissemination of non-public activities of government through sites like WikiLeaks
may jeopardize legitimate functions
of government such as international
relations and active law enforcement
investigations. Snowden’s leaks, for
example, are reported to have endangered the lives of British M16 agents in
Russia and China.
Laws lose their authority when governments can no longer control the
use of power to enforce rules and hackers have control over weapons of mass
disruption. Network infrastructure
removes the state’s monopoly on the
use of coercive, police power to enforce
rules and protect its citizens. Technol-
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ogy allows lone-wolf actors unchecked
by states to create and deploy weapons
of mass disruption whether through
malware, ransomware, or botnets. For
example, hospitals across the U.S. in
the spring of 2016 faced a wave of ransomware attacks that left some in a
“state of emergency.” ISIS uses crowd
sourcing to sow terror in the U.S. and
Europe. Simultaneously, the infrastructure empowers private actors to engage
in vigilante actions. The underground
group, Anonymous, recently illustrated such actions when they threatened
an electronic attack against ISIS following the Paris massacres in November 2016. In essence, individuals and
associations now have tools—outside
the ability of state control—to enforce
their choices and rules online in ways
that are independent of the state. To
be sure when a Texas college discovered in 2015 that Facebook provided
better real-time information for an oncampus police emergency than 911, it
becomes clear the state has even lost
control over basic information it needs
to protect its citizens.
Beyond undermining key aspects of
the rule of law, the Internet’s infrastructure has toppled critical, substantive
legal pillars of democracy. Freedom of
thought and association as well as public safety are essential elements of democracy and privacy is a prerequisite.
Yet, the network infrastructure contradicts the basic tenents of freedom
of association and privacy. Network
functionality works thanks to ubiquitous data surveillance. The resulting
transparency of citizens to those in the
network undermine both state and citizen’s respect for the rule of law. States
lose important checks and balances
against omnipotent acquisition of information and citizen’s freedom of
thought and association are undercut.
Counterintuitively, public safety and
security are also destabilized by the
transparency when stalkers, social engineering hackers, and cyberwarriors
find the informational keys to success
readily accessible online.
Freedom of expression is another
cornerstone of democracy. Yet, democracies have a capability problem
dealing with socially destructive content like hate, threats, and cyberbullying that jeopardize public order and
individual safety. Technology allows
28
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Beyond undermining
key aspects of
the rule of law,
the Internet
infrastructure has
toppled critical
substantive legal
pillars of democracy.

rapid and widespread dissemination
of harmful content, while wrongdoers can shield their activities from accountability through encryption and
anonymity tools. At the same time, freedom of expression limits the authority
of states to ban nefarious online content. In the U.S., for example, there is
no public recourse for the rapid growth
of anti-Semitic Twitter accounts. Users
must appeal to the social media firms
who, in turn, then decide what to suppress or censor. By contrast, in Europe,
platforms bear more legal responsibility for content, but firms are often left
in the same position as an all-powerful
censor. In effect, government is unable to suppress the vile and corrosive
online material that threatens citizens
without resorting to oppressive, antidemocratic controls.
The Opportunity of Digitocracy
The information society lacks a model
of governance suited to the digital age.
Going forward, the digital age will need
a new system of checks and balances
for its political decision making—a
“Digitocracy”—offering the opportunity to develop new governing principles
that articulate who regulates what to
preserve public accountability online.
Our challenge is how to construct
the appropriate checks and balances.
Digitocracy’s dynamic will be much
more complex than the analog world.
Online private rule making like Twitter’s decisions regarding censorship,
Adobe’s technical protections on digital content, and Facebook’s settings
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for privacy have become more powerful in people’s lives than rules from the
democratic constitutional framework.
Business organizations are likely to
serve as counterweights to government power. Google’s Transparency
Report, Apple’s defiance of an FBI request for encryption keys, and Microsoft’s challenge to U.S. government
access to foreign-based servers each
reflect a check on the state’s intrusiveness. And, individuals like Snowden
may serve as counterweights to states
and businesses. Individuals and associations of individuals have direct
authority when they coalesce with online tools ranging from social media to
hacktivism as they perceive the need
to interject and amplify their end goals
online. All while national government
provides checks on overreaching private actors. Where each actor from a
state to an individual can assure mass
disruption online, fair governance will
require co-existence among the rulemaking actors.
At the core, the assurance of public
accountability online is the key objective of Digitocracy. The mechanisms
for states, private actors and citizens
to co-exist as rule-makers in the networked society are likely to be defined
in unexpected ways incorporating notions of federalism, multistakeholder
governance, and subsidiarity. These
tools will draw the boundaries of rulemaking authority among the state actors, platform operators, corporate organizations, and empowered users. Each
actor, whether state or non-state, has an
important role to prevent overreaching
by the other actors. In essence, Digitocracy constructs a more multifaceted
set of interwoven checks and balances
to establish limits on the powers of
both state and non-state actors and a
reliance on both to protect the public
good. For our future, now is the time
to begin the robust public discussion
on our means of governance in the
digital age.
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